治理公路超载超限运输的长效机制和对策研究

为建立治理超载超限运输的长效机制,首先建立了运输企业收入的计量模型,分析了企业利润与运输价格、运输成本、超载罚款等变量之间的互动关系及企业获得最大利润的条件。在此基础上,针对中国道路货运市场结构的特点,从理性经济人的角度,对运输企业在“惩罚博弈”下可能的行为选择进行了研究;其次结合美国治理超载超限运输的经验,分析了不同执法强度和执法密度组合的执法策略及其适用条件、执法效果等,对中国治理超载超限运输提出了解决方案和具体的政策建议,对中国治理超载超限运输具有指导意义。     

Sharing costs in Swedish road ownership associations

Usually transport systems, and roads in particular, are viewed as public goods. However, this is not always the case. In Sweden a large part of the road system is privately owned. Most of these privately owned roads are rural roads used by farmers and summer cottage owners, or used for forest transport. These roads are mainly provided by ownership associations.An important difference between public roads and these privately owned roads is that all investments- and maintenance decisions are made by the users themselves, who also have to pay the costs, whereas the usual case is that the owners/providers of a road-system are different agents than the users. Here the question is not how to charge the roads but how to split the costs of the roads among the users in an efficient and “fair” way.The motivation of this paper is the practical problem of how such an ownership association can divide the costs for the road network among the members in an efficient and “fair” way. The problem is treated from a game theoretical point of view, making use of the Shapley value. This means that the problem is associated with a game - a mathematical representation of the conflict situation. The Shapley value is a very important solution concept for cooperative games, like the game in this case. For games corresponding to this specific type of problems, it is shown that the Shapley value has excellent properties, such as beeing an element of the core, and beeing very easy to compute.     

Bottleneck congestion and distribution of work start times: The economics of staggered work hours revisited

Since the seminal work of Henderson (Henderson, J.V., 1981. The economics of staggered work hours. Journal of Urban Economics 9 (3), 349–364), a number of studies have examined the effect of staggered work hours by analyzing models of work start time choice that consider the trade-off between negative congestion externalities and positive production externalities. However, these studies employed flow congestion models to describe traffic congestion. This study develops a model of work start time choice with bottleneck congestion and discloses the intrinsic properties of the model. To this end, this study extends Henderson’s model to incorporate bottleneck congestion. By utilizing the properties of a potential game, we characterize equilibrium and optimal distributions of work start times. We also show that Pigouvian tax/subsidy policies generally yield multiple equilibria and that the first-best optimum must be a stable equilibrium under Pigouvian policies, whereas the second-best optimum in which policymakers cannot eliminate queuing congestion can be unstable.     

QoS awared power and admission controls based on non-cooperative game theory in wireless networks

In order to better accommodate heterogeneous quality of service (QoS) in wireless networks, an algorithm called QeS-aware power and admission controls (QAPAC) is proposed. The system is modeled as u non- cooperative game where the users adjust their transmit powers to maximize the utility, thus restraining the interferences. By using adaptive utility functions and tunable pricing parameters according to QoS levels, this algorithm can well meet different QoS reqniremcnts and improve system capacity compared with those that ignore the QoS differ- ences.     

对超载与查超的经济学反思

为探索治理超载的有效策略,采用博弈论的方法对超载现象进行了一般经济分析,并结合我国公路运输行业现状和公路的管理方式,分析了对超载现象在我国居高不下的原因以及不同治理策略的优缺点。结果表明,超载现象泛滥的根本原因在于运输市场不规范所造成的查超成本太高和恶性竞争,以及收费公路的运行体制导致的运输企业利润空间的下降;适合我国现状的治超策略在于治理运输市场和降低公路收费。     

基于博弈论的船舶电力系统脆性负熵流分析

将博弈论引入到船舶电力系统性负熵流研究中,研究表明,船舶电力系统务子系统对负熵的获取是满足极大熵准则下的非合作博弈.通过仿真表明船舶电力系统务子系统对负熵流的合理获取对船舶电力系统的安全稳定性至关重要.     

道路货运市场退出与治超关系分析

完善的市场退出管理体系是运输市场发育成熟的表现，也是建立治超长效机制的一项具体内容。本丈首先分析了市场退出的内涵及其管理的现状，得出运输经营主体市场退出管理存在两个方面的问题，退出管理不作为和退出保障不完善；然后，对货运经营者的两种选择退出与不退出进行了深入分析，认为在退出成本高和超载有利可图两方面因素的影响下，不退出成为理性选择；最后，从降低退出成本和增加超载运输成本着手，提出了一些具体的治超措施。     

考虑资金约束的中欧班列运价与运量决策分析

针对围绕中欧班列业务而产生的中小企业资金约束问题,本文考虑运输价格和运输服务质量双重需求特征,构建由中欧班列和国际货代公司组成的二级物流服务供应链博弈模型,分别求解无资金约束、银行融资、中欧融资及集中决策这4种情景下双方的运价决策和利润函数。以利润函数最大化为目标,探究货代公司自有资金、中欧班列运输服务质量对双方定价与融资决策影响的作用机理,验证不同融资模式选择的可行范围,并进行数值分析。研究表明：资金约束使得中欧班列运输价格升高,但相比银行融资模式,中欧融资模式能够提供更低的运输价格。中欧融资模式下,双方利润受货代公司自有资金的影响,只有当自有资金小于某临界值时,双方才会 选择该融资模式,且中欧融资模式下,供应链整体绩效高于银行融资模式。     

A path-based flow formulation for the traffic assignment problem

In order to improve cooperation between traffic management and travelers, traffic assignment is the key component to achieve the objectives of both traffic management and route choice decisions for travelers. Traffic assignment can be classified into two models based on the behavioral assumptions governing route choices: User Equilibrium (UE) and System Optimum (SO) traffic assignment. According to UE and SO traffic assignment, travelers usually compete to choose the least cost routes to minimize their own travel costs, while SO traffic assignment requires travelers to work cooperatively to minimize overall cost in the road network. Thus, the paradox of benefits between UE and SO indicates that both are not practical. Thus, a solution technique needs to be proposed to balance UE and SO models, which can compromise both sides and give more feasible traffic assignments. In this paper, Stackelberg game theory is introduced to the traffic assignment problem, which can achieve the trade-off process between traffic management and travelers. Since traditional traffic assignments have low convergence rates, the gradient projection algorithm is proposed to improve efficiency.